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Macroeconomic Imbalances in the World Economy 
 
Terry Roe, Mathew Shane and Kari Heerman
1  
 
Abstract: This paper explores the emergence of large current account imbalances in a 
few large countries, the factors behind the emergence, the role of those imbalances in the 
financial crisis of 2008-09, and the implications of achieving global 
balance.  Imbalances reflect a country’s net savings and suggest that growth in GDP of a 
surplus country is partly dependent upon growth in external demand of deficit countries. 
Although a country can incur a surplus or deficit for ever, we suggest that the increasing 
surpluses of relatively large and rapidly growing countries is likely to be destabilizing to 
global growth in the long-run. The adjustment will likely require a surplus country, such 
as China, to rely more on domestic demand for growth while a deficit country, such as 
the U.S., may need to rely more on external demand for growth.   We suggest the 
Eurozone imbalances are not directly linked to U.S. imbalances.  There are a variety of 
potential causes of global imbalances including excess savings in surplus countries, the 
twin deficit hypothesis, the export-led growth hypothesis, and the possible miss-
measurement of the U.S. current account due to repatriation of profits from U.S. owned 
foreign affiliates.   However, whatever the combination of causes of the growing 
imbalances, adjustments need to be made to return to long-term sustainable growth. 
 
Key Words: Current account, imbalance, exchange rate, savings glut 
 




Many suggest the financial crises that ushered in the recession beginning 2008 has as its root, the 
growing global imbalances that some date back to the East Asian financial crises of the late 
1990s
2. This event coincides with a relatively large increase in the current account (CA) 
imbalances of relatively small number of countries, with the U.S. and China being most 
                                                            
1 This is a revision of a paper by the same title presented at the annual meetings of the American Agricultural 
Economic Association (AAEA), Denver Col., July 2010.  Views expressed are those of the authors alone. Roe is 
Professor, and Heerman a graduate student, University of Minnesota.  Shane is Senior Economist, USDA/ERS. 
Appreciation is expressed to Cheryl Christenson, Chief of the Food Security and Development Branch of ERS for 
her review and comments on earlier drafts as well the feedback provided by AAEA session participants. 
 
2Mayer-Foulkes (2009) links the root of the 2008 world financial crises and CA imbalances to the acceleration of 
financial globalization in which foreign direct investment and the repatriation of profits by transnational 
corporations play a central role.  Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) argue that the U.S. CA deficit has to be viewed as the 
net result of the collective investment and saving decisions of the entire world, and thus cannot be explained by U.S. 
Macroeconomic policy alone. They suggest, as does McKinnon (2010) and Aizenman et al (2007) that the savings 
glut in East Asian emerging markets was part of the cause because it was more than sufficient to fund domestic 
investment leading to current account surpluses. Views on adjustments vary. McKinnon parts ways with Krugman's 




3.  Growth in China's CA surplus, which by a simple accounting identity, equals a 
countries net saving balance, parallels growth in the U.S. CA deficit.  Globally, the net savings 
balance must sum to zero so that one country's CA surplus must be others' CA deficit. This 
constraint suggests that countries such as China cannot continue indefinitely to rely on foreign 
demand to sustain growth, and that an eventual rebalancing must entail CA deficit countries 
relying more upon growth in external demand and deficit countries less on growth in internal 
demand. The puzzle is how this rebalancing is to be accomplished in an orderly way. 
 
This paper explores the emergence of large current account imbalances in a few large countries, 
the factors behind the emergence and the implications for global balance and the financial crisis 
of 2008-09
4. The imbalance effect on other economies is exacerbated because size matters; 
China and Japan's CA surplus in 2008 was almost 45 percent of total world CA surplus, and 
jumps to almost 60 percent if the CA surplus of selected European countries is subtracted from 
the world total
5. To maintain disproportionately large CA surpluses, countries tend to prevent the 
real value of their currencies from appreciating relative to the currencies of countries supplying 
the external demand by sterilizing their excess foreign exchange holdings.   To maintain a 
relatively low currency value to the U.S. dollar, a country can exchange their excess dollar 
holdings for dollar denominated assets.  Since most primary commodities are exchanged in 
dollars, and other countries are willing to hold reserves in U.S. dollars, this further facilitates this 
strategy by providing other dollar denominated activities that have negligible effects on the value 
of the dollar.   
 
An undervalued currency tends to subsidize a country’s producers of traded goods, and to attract 
multinational enterprises that employ the country's relatively abundant resources to compete in 
international markets. An undervalued currency tends to implicitly tax domestic households by 
limiting their purchasing power (and thus dampening their demand for domestic goods), while 
stimulating employment in the production of traded goods.  Another factor helping a country to 
supply external demand is the savings behavior of households.  Chinese and Japanese households 
in particular tend to save at rates that are in excess of that needed to finance increased production 
capacity to meet growing domestic and external demand.  Some of this excess savings (gross 
savings minus gross capital formation) is used to purchase dollar denominated assets thus 
providing investment funds to make up the shortfall of savings in deficit countries, particularly 
the United States (Figure 1).  Notice that with the onset of the global financial crisis after 2008, 
both China’s surplus and the U.S. deficit declined.  Part of this decline is explained by the lagged 
response to the real appreciation of the Yuan and the real depreciation of the dollar, and to the 
decline globally in total final expenditures (Anderton and Tewolde, 2011). 
                                                            
3See Aizenman and Sun (2010), and World Economic Outlook, April 2010. 
 
4Pittes (2010) argues it is impossible for either China or the U.S. to adjust to this imbalance without a major 
counterbalancing adjustment from the other. He suggests that the inability to adjust could lead to a steep drop in 
global growth, much of it borne by China, and possibly even a collapse in global trade. 
 
5We show later that the CA surplus of major European countries is roughly equal to the CA deficit of other 








For a country incurring a net savings deficit, such as the U.S., a number of characteristics help to 
supply the necessary external demand.  One is the dollar serves as the world's numeraire 
currency.  Another is fiscal deficits (which approached 5 percent of GDP by 2008), as well as 
relatively efficient capital markets which create financial instruments that help countries sterilize 
their positive net savings including their excess holding of dollars.  These capital inflows place 
downward pressures on U.S. real interest rates (declining from about 4.0% in 2000 to 2.0% in 
2005)
6. These pressures tend to reduce domestic savings because returns are lower, and to 
appreciate dollar denominated asset prices.  Inflated asset prices tend to give the illusion of an 
increase in wealth.  At the same time, imports of foreign goods appear relatively cheap.   
Together, these forces induce an increase in consumption expenditures- partly by withdrawing 
home equity- with the supply of imported goods helping to dampen inflation in consumer prices 
(although building material prices increased, food, clothing, transportation, household durable 
prices remained relatively flat over the 1990 - 2008 period).  The growth in countries' net saving 
surplus-deficit coincided with an increased globalization of world capital markets and growth in 
gross global capital flows that exceeded 16 percent of world GDP in 2007
7.  This growth in 
                                                            
6Taken from Blanchard's presentation, Mexico City, May 2007. 
 




















































global capital flows (e.g., converting US consumption into Chinese savings which are then 
recycled back into U.S. financial markets), together with households’ response to appreciating 
asset values, and bankers’ eagerness to accommodate increasing demand for credit, can be 
argued to have facilitated financial innovations including the invention of new derivative 
financial assets.  The growing integration of global capital markets as this process evolved in the 
early 2000s resulted in contagion effects on other advanced countries.   
 
These forces appear to have set the stage for the financial crises of 2008 that, at the depth of the 
recession, led to a decline in the annual rate of growth in real US GDP per capita of 3.9 percent 
which amounts to a decline from trend growth per capita of almost 6 percentage points.  If the 
economy simply returns to trend growth rates without a higher rate to compensate for the 
recession, the discounted present value of the loss in real per capita income, assuming a discount 
rate of 3.5 percent over a twenty year period, is about $16,000. 
 
We focuses next on the growth of global imbalances, the role of exchange rates in maintaining 
the imbalance, and then, using a simple numerical illustration, argue that continued growth in the 
imbalances is not sustainable in the longer term.  This constraint implies that adjustments are 
likely to entail CA surplus countries becoming more reliant on internal demand for economic 
growth and deficit countries becoming more reliant on external demand for growth. We conclude 
with a short discussion of some of the likely causes of the growth in imbalances that have 
emerged since the late 1990s. 
 
2. The growth in current account imbalances 
 
2.1 The role of exchange rates in the growth of global imbalances 
 
The exchange rate can be an extremely powerful instrument to alter a country’s relative 
competitiveness in global markets.  By devaluing the exchange rate relative to the dollar, in a 
single action, the prices of all traded goods relative to nontradeables is changed, thus altering 
incentives of domestic agents to produce tradeable commodities rather than increase the supply 
of domestic non internationally traded goods.  While we present various arguments for why the 
pattern of growing current account surpluses and deficits occurred later in the paper, one major 
factor has been the systematic undervaluation of the Chinese Yuan and the overvaluation of the 
U.S. dollar.  Figure 2 shows that, historically, there have been major swings in the relative value 
of the dollar, with a modest trend toward depreciation. Since the dollar has been used as the 
world’s reserve currency following the breakdown of the gold standard in 1973, its modest 
depreciation has not been sufficient to reverse the country’s tendency for its CA deficit to 












The Chinese Yuan, on the other hand has had a long term pattern of depreciation through 2005 
(Figure. 4).  This pattern has contributed to the competitiveness of Chinese goods in international 


































Figure 2. The real quarterly U.S. export trade-





























Figure 3. U.S. current account as a share of GDP: 
the current account  deficit has tended to increase 
over time6 
 
global trade both with regard to the relative share of China’s exports to GDP, but also her share 
of exports to total world exports.  The Yuan has appreciated since 2006.  If this continues or 




















































2.2 The data on current account imbalances 
 
Large CA imbalances are concentrated in a few economies over the period 2005-10 (IMF, June 
2011).  Five countries (U.S., Spain, the UK, Australia and Italy) account for 79 percent of world 
CA deficits while another five countries (China, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the Russian 
Federation) account for 71 percent of world CA surplus
8.  The US and China account for the 
largest deficit - surplus shares that average 57 percent and 26 percent, respectively.  Adding 
Japan to China's surplus increases their CA share to over 1/3 of world CA surplus over the 2001-
09 period.   
 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the US CA deficit in total world deficits and China and Japan in 
total world CA surplus. Notice the rise in China's share following the East Asian financial crisis 
of the late 1990s.  Of particular interest is the sharp increase in the US share of total world CA 
deficits, and while falling after 2002, still dominate the share of total world deficits. 
 
                                                            





















































While the U.S. CA deficit has fallen since the financial crisis, the share of China has increased.  
This depiction is even more pronounced if we remove from the data European CA surplus-deficit 
countries.   
 
Figure 7 depicts, in billions of dollars, the CA surplus of Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
Switzerland and the CA deficits of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Greece.  As suggested by 
the simple regression equation for the years when the Euro has been in effect, (1999 – 2010) 
European CA surplus countries appear to be largely financing the net saving deficits of her CA 
deficit countries.  While there was some contraction of the EU surpluses and deficits in 2009 
because of the global recession, they expanded again in 2010.  The offsetting nature of the EU 
imbalances suggests underlying problems with integrating euro zone countries with diverse fiscal 
policy environments under a single currency.  This also suggests that the U.S. case is rather 
unique, and related to using the dollar as a reserve currency
9. 
                                                            
9The pattern of imbalance starting in 1999 might link to a Euro that is undervalued for the higher per capita income 





























































If we focus on the CA imbalances between the U.S., and Japan, China and oil exporters, we 
observe a pattern where China’s growth in CA surplus corresponds to the growth in the U.S. CA 
deficit (Figure 8).  To infer cause and effect conclusively, an analysis of countries’ capital 
accounts would be required. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
European resources, particularly labor, remain relatively spatially restricted and some countries have incurred fiscal 
deficits. A departure of the Euro from an economy’s underlying fundamentals in this environment can exacerbate 










































Figure 7: European Surplus Countries Offset European Deficit 






   
 
 
The regression shows a relatively high correlation between US CA deficits and China and 
Japan's net saving surplus over the period 1990-2010.  The surplus-deficit pattern suggests the 
recycling back to the US of their exchange earnings, much of which was in the form of US 
treasuries and other U.S. dollar assets.  Other sources of capital flows to the U.S. are the oil 
surplus countries. This process, as Pettis (2010) notes, serves as a great liquidity generator for the 
world, converting U.S. consumption into Chinese and Japanese savings, which are then recycled 
back into U.S financial markets. 
 
2.3 On the sustainability of large CA imbalances 
 
Subject to statistical discrepancies, the sum of all current account surpluses and deficits in a 
common currency must equal zero.  Following  Aizenman and Sun (2010), this world constraint 
for each  t  can be stated as  
 








where    t GDP i   denotes gross national product (GDP) of the   th i    country,     t GDP w    
 t GDP i i    denotes world GDP, and the   th i    country's current account    t CA   to GDP ratio 



























Figure 8: China, Japan and the Oil Exporters are financing the U.S. 
Deficit









Next, let's separate China and aggregate the rest of the world in this identity.  Let the  c  
subscript denote China and  o  denote the rest of the world. Then, the constraint becomes 
 
   











c    
where world GDP is       . t GDP t GDP t GDP o c w     Suppose the following: China's real GDP 
continues to grow at the average rate observed over the 2003-2008 period of   1047 . 0  c x   per 
annum while the rest of the world grows at its average rate observed over the same period of  
. 0314 . 0  o x    Presume further that China seeks to sustain net external demand as a proportion of 
GDP at the rate of   073 . 0  c   , a rate she sustained on average over the same period.   
 
These assumptions imply the following paths of     t GDP i    








e GDP t GDP






beginning in some initial year denoted by     0 i GDP  .  China's CA surplus can be calaculated as 
follows  
   
t
c c e GDP t CA
1047 . 0 0 073 . 0   
Given the world CA constraint stated above, this implies an evolution of the CA to GDP ratio for 






















0 073 . 0
0
0 073 . 0
      
 
The smaller the ratio     , 0 / 0 o c GDP GDP   i.e., the smaller the economy in question relative to the 
rest of the world, the smaller is the effect of one country’s imbalance on the rest of the world.  
Thus, size matters.  Further, since the rate of growth of China, in this example, exceeds that of 
the rest of the world, i.e.,   , 0   o c x x      , t o    a negative value, increases in absolute terms 
geometrically. At 2008 values of     0 o GDP   and    , 0 c GDP   the rest of the rest of the worlds'  
 t o    value, a net deficit, would double in about 9.5 years.   
 
We illustrate the effect on the U.S. CA deficit assuming that Japan and China’s CA surplus 
correlates with the U.S. CA deficit as predicted by the equation appearing in Figure 8. We use 





j j e G b e G b a t CA        
 where   038 . 0  j    and   073 . 0  c   are the average value over the 2003-08 period of the two 
countries’ CA to GDP ratio, and trend growth in their respective nominal GDP’s are  0155 . 0  j x  




us e GDP t GDP 0    where   , 0536 . 0  us x  Figure 9 shows the US CA deficit as a percent of 
GDP, i.e., the term    t us   , from the year 2010 to 2030.  Business as usual suggests that in about 
thirty years the US CA deficit as a percent of GDP would reach its all time high of over 6 12 
 
percent..  Together, China and Japan’s GDP are roughly 65 percent of US GDP. Thus, the values 
 0 j G  and   0 c G  are relatively large.  China’s growth in nominal GDP (since the regression 
equation is in nominal terms) is large relative to the U.S. Consequently, the U.S. CA imbalance 





We conclude that imbalances in the world economy are linked to a relatively small number of the 
world's larger economies. The CA deficits and surplus of the selected countries suggest that the 
EU surplus - deficit economies may be unrelated, at least in a direct way, to the economic forces 
associated with the U.S. and the Japan and China imbalances. We also make the point that 
"business as usual," i.e. "big" economies relying upon external demand to sustain their growth in 
GDP is likely to increase these imbalances.  Thus, it seems reasonable to conjecture that major 
adjustment is likely wherein large net saving countries rely more on internal demand for 
economic growth while many of the negative net saving countries rely more on external demand 
for economic growth.  These imbalances are symptoms of some underlying economic forces that 
need to be assessed more clearly to determine whether the imbalances are "natural" - market 
driven forces, whether they reflect possible market failures or,  the choices of major economies 
pursuing export-led growth policies that externalize the impact of imbalances upon other 
countries.   
 
 
3. Possible causes of imbalances 
 
Global capital flows between the U.S. and the rest of the world appear to be just the opposite 
from what many economists might have expected.  In a stylized world, emerging economies 





























































Figure 9: U.S. Current Account as Percent of 
GDP, Data and Simulation
data simulation13 
 
their stock of capital per unit of labor.  While their savings rates tend to be relatively high, their 
level of savings is too low to support capital deepening at a rate of return commensurate with 
rates prevailing in the capital markets of advanced nations.  Multinational companies take 
advantage of the relative factor abundance implied by the differential rates of return between 
advanced and emerging economies, causing net capital inflows to the emerging economies.  The 
expected result is a CA surplus for rich countries and negative CA of emerging economies. 
These imbalances could grow and reach a long run equilibrium where, relative to country GDP, 
they remain relatively constant forever.  Our discussion above, at least for the U.S., suggests just 
the opposite.   
 
A large body of literature has emerged to explain this result.  In our brief review of this material, 
we categorize this literature into four themes: a savings glut in emerging economies and China in 
particular, U.S. fiscal deficits that create a supply of relatively safe assets, the pursuit of export 
led growth by emerging economies, and the mis-measurement of the U.S. current account.   
 
3.1 The savings glut: growth in savings relative to the abundance of safe assets  
 
In a well-known 2005 speech, United States Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, argued 
that global imbalances, and the US current account deficit in particular, are rooted in a 
prodigious increase in the global supply of savings since the late 1990’s, which he dubbed the 
“global saving glut.”  Since the United States has been the primary destination for this savings, it 
has effectively become a substantial net borrower from the rest of the world (Bernanke 2005). 
The proximate conclusion is Americans’ level of saving is too low.  Bernanke suggests that 
massive capital inflows from the rest of the world inflated asset values, a point we noted in the 
introduction to this paper.  Consequently, American firms’ and households’ perceptions of their 
wealth was modified by a rise in value of the assets they held leading to a reduction in savings 
and an increase in consumption.   
Blanchard (2008) notes the growth in East Asian level of saving following the late 1990's 
financial crises.  He suggests the crises led to higher uncertainty both at the individual and 
aggregate level in this region.  The emergence of markets in China is associated with the collapse 
of the safety net provided by the state.  This transformation introduced additional firm and 
household risk and thus induced an increase in precautionary savings.  At the same time, new 
market opportunities signaled increased earnings from moving from agriculture to non-
agricultural employment, and higher returns to education, all of which provided households 
incentives for an increase in savings. Pettis (2010) argues that China has had net excess savings 
implying that China was more than able to finance its own investment (see Figure 1 above).  He 
then suggests that investment caused growth in production to exceed growth in domestic demand 
which caused a growing trade surplus and the accumulation of foreign currency reserves.  Given 
China’s net savings surplus, it seems surprising that the Government followed a policy of 
encouraging direct foreign investment.  In recent years, net foreign direct investment in China 
has run around $50 billion.  While they had adequate domestic saving to finance investment, 
direct foreign investment in China was more than a financial transaction.  Associated with 
China’s growth has been a substantial transfer of technology resulting in total factor productivity 
growth averaging around 3 percent a year (Shane, 2004). 
 14 
 
In several papers, Ricardo Caballero and co-authors argue that the primary driver of the present 
imbalances is the combination of the saving glut in emerging economies and a limited global 
supply of low-risk assets.  After the financial crises of the 1990s, the perceived soundness of 
developing country financial assets declined substantially, causing East Asian investors to seek 
safe investments externally, particularly in the United States (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas 
2008a, 2008b; Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2009; Caballero 2010).  Indeed, the recent period of 
large and growing current account deficits has coincided with massive accumulation of US dollar 
reserves and treasuries by developing countries, particularly in East Asia (Aizenman 2008; 
Bems, Dedola, and Smets 2007; Bernanke 2005; Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 2004; 
Jeanne 2007).  Caballero and co-authors explain that by about 2001, the demand for safe debt 
instruments had risen above what the US corporate world could “naturally” provide.  In order to 
satisfy demand, lenders created triple-A assets by securitizing and tranching riskier payment 
streams like sub-prime mortgages and student loans.  This caused leverage to build up in the 
financial system generating considerable instability and driving up the value of other assets in 
short supply like real estate (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2009). 
 
A body of literature focuses on a precautionary or self-insurance motive to explain the large 
capital flows from developing countries to the U.S.  Aizenman and Lee (2005) find evidence that 
demand for international reserves can be explained by precautionary savings to self-insure 
against capital account crisis using data from 1980-2000.  However, for the 2000 – 2005 period, 
Jeanne (2007) finds that the costs of a capital account crisis must be extraordinarily large in order 
to justify the level of reserves accumulation in this period.  Aizenman (2008) reconciles these 
accounts, noting two structural shifts in the trend of reserves accumulation.  Increased reserves 
accumulation in 1997-2000 is well-explained by precaution in the face of the aggregate risk of 
capital account crisis.  He finds the increase in reserves accumulation after 2000 was mainly 
driven by China.   
 
Forbes (2010) takes a broader perspective than the precautionary and self-insurance literature.  
Her analysis of international capital flows finds the most consistent result is that a country's 
financial development is an important factor affecting its share of investment in both U.S. equity 
and debt markets. She finds that countries with less developed financial markets, such as China 
and other East Asian countries, invest a larger share of their portfolios in the U.S. and the 
magnitude of this effect decreases with income per capita.  Countries that trade with the U.S. 
also invest more in U.S. equity and debt markets, and countries with fewer capital controls tend 
to invest more in U.S. equities.  Blanchard (2007) and Cooper (2005) express similar views.  
Nevertheless, safety is an important factor determining capital flows.  This is illustrated in 
Forbes’ analysis: foreign investors did sell U.S. equities, corporate and agency debt during the 
peak of the crisis, but they also purchased $381 billion of U.S. T-bills, up sharply from about $75 
billion in both the 1st half of 2008 and the 2nd half of 2009.  
 
3.2 The twin-deficits hypothesis 
 
An alternative view of global imbalances finds their source in U.S. fiscal deficits and monetary 
policy.  Proponents of this view argue that U.S. policy raised disposable household income 
beyond factor earnings from the production of goods and services.  The resulting increase in 15 
 
consumption gives rise to excess demand for tradable goods, causing the value of imports to 
exceed the value of exports and an appreciation of the real exchange rate.  US export 
competitiveness thus falls, widening the current account deficit. Several authors refer to this 
explanation as the “twin-deficits hypothesis.” 
Bems, Dedola and Smets (2007) are able to explain much of the behavior of the US current 
account during the 1980’s and 2000’s in a structural VAR model identifying fiscal shocks, 
monetary shocks and productivity shocks.  A positive government spending shock is found to 
lead to an immediate deterioration in the current account, whereas a tax cut’s effect on the 
external balance takes longer to materialize and is less significant. However, their model’s 
predictions diverge from the data in the late 1990’s, leaving the trade deficit that began to 
emerge in the late 1990s unexplained.  The authors suggest that non-US factors, specifically the 
Asian financial crisis, might have been important determinants of the U.S. current account 
deficits during this latter period.   
While some authors (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2005) suggest that the fiscal deficit contributes to 
current account imbalances, they tend to place more emphasis on other factors. Others reject the 
twin-deficits hypothesis, pointing out that while US fiscal and current account deficits have both 
widened since 2000, they were negatively correlated during the 1990’s (Backus and Henriksen 
2009; Bernanke 2005).  Caballero (2008a, 2008b) argues that the mechanism through which 
fiscal deficits generate current account deficits would also drive up interest rates, in contrast to 
the data.  Corsetti and Muller (2006) find that the twin deficits hypothesis is more likely to hold 
with persistent fiscal shocks in countries with a large share of imports in GDP, which is not the 
case of the U.S.   
3.3 The export-led growth hypothesis 
The economic development and growth literature contains extensive discussion on relationships 
between exports and economic growth. Part of this debate centers on whether countries should 
promote the export sector to obtain economic growth.  Empirical evidence in support of this 
being a successful strategy is weak.  Giles and Williams (1999) conclude from their review of 
this literature that the results from various time-series based studies are not robust to 
specification and method. They caution extreme care when interpreting much of the applied 
research on the export-led growth hypothesis.   
 
In the case of China, the long-term pattern of the real value of the Yuan depreciating relative to 
the dollar occurred in spite of the rapid growth in the Chinese economy over the 1978-2010 
period which exceeded by a factor of almost two that of the U.S. economy over this period.  If 
the two countries saving rates were roughly equal (which of course they are not), the prices of 
China’s non-internationally traded goods could be expected to have increased at a more rapid 
rate than the prices of U.S.’s non-internationally traded goods, that is, a real appreciation of the 
Yuan. Only since 2006, has China experienced a modest real appreciation.  Given that economic 
growth has only recently been accompanied by a modest real appreciation, it could be argued 
that economic growth drove exports, instead of exports driving growth.  In a panel study, Yang 
(2008) in fact finds that economic growth led to only a modest real appreciation of the Yuan. His 
findings suggest that growth has driven China’s exports rather than exports causing growth.  16 
 
Another view of export led growth is termed the Bretton Woods II hypothesis by Dooley, 
Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2004).  They argue that the Bretton Woods system of managed 
exchange rates was never truly eliminated; rather it went through a period of dormancy only to 
re-emerge with a new “periphery”.  The United States remains the “center.”  Like Japan and 
Europe just after World War II, the new periphery countries – mostly in East Asia – forego high 
returns in favor of accumulating foreign reserves from the center.  These countries thus hold 
down the value of their currency to subsidize exports and build their domestic capital stock.  The 
strain on the income and trade accounts of the United States is a side effect of this strategy.   
 A logical conclusion from Bretton Woods II is that if China were to allow its currency to float, 
global imbalances would move toward resolution.  It has become de rigeur for policy makers and 
opinion leaders to call on China to increase the flexibility of its exchange rate regime.  The 
presumption is that the Chinese currency will appreciate against the dollar and facilitate 
rebalancing by eroding its export competitiveness.  Cheung, Chinn and Fujii (2009) find 
evidence that an appreciation of the bilateral US-China exchange rate would reduce the bilateral 
trade imbalance, although they contend that the extent to which the Yuan is undervalued is not 
well-understood.  Chinn and Wei (2008) demonstrate that the flexibility of a country’s de facto 
exchange rate regime and the rate of convergence of its current account are not significantly 
correlated, raising concern as to the degree to which Yaun appreciation alone will rebalance U.S. 
– China imbalances. 
Pettis (2010) suggests China pursues a Bretton Woods II strategy in response to a high rate of 
domestic savings.  He contends that high savings are a response to opportunities presented by 
market opening.  He explains that savings in China is “systematically funneled into domestic 
investment.”  This generates a surplus of domestic production over consumption which must be 
exported.  Foreign currency, mainly dollars, earned from exporting is purchased by the central 
bank and “recycled” back to the United States through purchases of treasuries and other dollar 
assets in order to maintain the currency peg, and hence the source of external demand while 
dampening domestic demand for traded goods due to an undervalued currency.  Aizenman 
(2008) offers a competitiveness argument to the hoarding of foreign reserves. He advances the 
notion that China engages in ‘competitive hoarding’ of reserves to improve its competitiveness 
in the markets of wealthy countries vis-a-vis its competitors.    
Whether China's recycling of dollars is for mercantilist purposes to support an export led growth 
strategy supported by the fact that U.S. treasury bills offer an opportunity to obtain a high, 
relatively risk free return remains an open question.  
3.4 Miss-measurement of the current account 
An entirely different perspective on global imbalances suggests that our understanding of 
external wealth is distorted by data limitations.  Mayer-Foulkes (2009) points out that profits of 
multinational corporations’ foreign affiliates skyrocketed over the period 1985-2007.  In 2007, 
70 percent of the roughly $1,100 billion in profits of foreign affiliates were repatriated. 
Repatriated earnings enter the balance sheet as foreign capital inflows although they arguably 
represent US wealth.  For the United States, these inflows are substantial.  Mayer-Foulkes shows 
that over 1980-2007, the volume of repatriated profits of foreign affiliates track US trade deficit 17 
 
very closely.  Interestingly from the perspective of global imbalances, much of this profit 
remained in the financial system, contributing to the saving glut described in Bernanke (2005).     
Others have asserted that changes in the value of foreign assets held over time are an important 
reflection of a country’s true external wealth.  So-called valuation effects, changes in the value of 
gross assets and liabilities and exchange rate movements, are not recorded as returns in the 
income account as traditionally measured.  Devereux and Sutherland (2009) use data from a 
subset of OECD countries to illustrate the quantitative importance of valuation effects between 
1980 and 2006.  Since the 1990’s these effects have become large relative to the traditional 
measure of the current account.  For every country in their sample except the United States the 
average valuation effect is between -2% and 0% of GDP.  For the United States it is 1.4%, 
implying that the measured current account overstates the deficit.   
Another challenge to current account measurement focuses on the treatment of intangible assets 
of foreign subsidiaries.  These assets have come to play an increasingly important role in the 
value of many countries’ external wealth.  Intangible assets represent much of the value of 
services firms, but they are also significant for manufacturing firms where much of the value of 
tangible assets is embodied in intangibles like branding and R&D.  Lipsey (2006) points out that 
the primary determinant of how intangible assets enter the US balance of payments is the 
“residence” of the firm that holds them on its books.  However, firms care about the residence of 
their intangible assets only inasmuch as it affects their tax bill.  A residence-based measure could 
therefore misrepresent a country’s external wealth.  
McGrattan and Prescott (2010) demonstrate how unmeasured returns on intangible assets affect 
the measured current account deficit.  The authors distinguish between plant-specific intangible 
assets and “technology capital”.   Technology capital captures general knowledge that can be 
used in any location and at multiple locations.  Plant-specific intangible capital is expensed in the 
early years of a FDI investment, whereas technology capital earns rents even when nothing is 
expensed.  Omitting technology capital from the measurement of returns on FDI causes the 
returns in long-term investments to appear overstated relative to newer investments.    Since US 
firms have been investing abroad since just after World War II whereas foreign firms’ presence 
in the United States was negligible until the 1970’s, this distorts the United States’ relative 
external wealth. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Current account surpluses of major economies are the deficits of others. The resulting 
acceleration in growth in these imbalances cannot be sustained indefinitely.  A CA surplus 
reflects a country’s net saving balance.  Growth in a country’s CA balance suggests that growth 
in GDP is partly dependent upon growth in external demand.  We show that the relative size of 
an economy and its relative rate of growth in GDP determine the degree to which an imbalance 
can grow.  Big economies, like Japan and more recently China stand out in this regard, while the 
U.S. stands out for its relatively high share of total world CA deficits (over 60 percent between 
2000-to 2005.).  CA imbalances grew dramatically over the 1990-2008 period and prior to the 
global crisis of 2008-09.  While a variety of factors could have led to growth in CA imbalances, 
the international liquidity and capital flow consequences of the growing imbalances were 18 
 
certainly a major causative factor in the global financial crisis that followed.  While patterns of 
growing imbalances can persist under the right circumstances for a long period of time, at some 
point, market and policy readjustments that provide incentives for CA deficit countries to expand 
exports and CA surplus countries to rely proportionately more on internal demand to maintain 
growth in GDP is almost inevitable.  The crisis of 2008-09 may reflect the beginning of these 
adjustments. Will the major countries interpret the crisis as a definitive statement that policies 
have to be changed and future growth has to take a different course? We have argued that 
continuing the past patterns of growth will not work because the growing CA imbalances are 
unsustainable under present circumstances.  This, however, is yet to be seen.  While there are 
some signs to changing direction, the changes to date have been fairly modest. 
 
The growing CA imbalances among European countries appear symmetric in the sense that the 
CA surpluses of some European countries appear to be the deficits of other European countries.  
While this is related to the rigidities of the euro zone countries, these imbalances have also led to 
major problems between the surplus and deficit euro zone countries which might result in further 
economic integration in the EU.  While the CA imbalance problem within the euro zone has its 
own distinct issues, the problem of growing CA imbalances have to be dealt with there as well.  .  
 
We explore a variety of potential causes of imbalances presented in the literature.  The savings 
glut in many of the Asian economies, and relatively large economies pursuing export-led growth 
policies is one possible explanation.  the flow of capital funds into the United States is certainly 
related to the efficiency of U.S. capital markets, and the repatriation of profits from U.S. based 
transnational corporations that enter U.S. national accounts as “foreign owned”. U.S. fiscal 
deficits, by generating a supply of treasury bills, have served to help supply foreign investors 
with a dollar denominated investment vehicle. While imbalances may be due to a combination of 
the forces discussed above, the growth in countries’ liabilities are surely bounded, and beyond 
some point, become a threat to global economic stability.  Will the problems caused by the 
financial crisis of 2008-09 lead to a rethinking of macroeconomic policies by the major players 
and generate a new sustained period of world growth?  This is still to be determined. 
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